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 Abstract 
This article analyses the historical and philosophical-sociological arguments of 
the struggle for the enforcement of Islamic law by the Islamic Sharia Enforcement 
Committee (KPPSI). Historically, proponents supporting KPPSI believe that the idea of 
the Shari'a struggle has strong historical roots in this area. The same goes for 
philosophical and sociological arguments. The arguments underlying the desire to enforce 
Islamic law are largely and normatively justified. However, this study has found out that 
there is no political situation that can be interpreted as a fundamental justification for 
demanding the idea makes the idea still a discourse. In fact, the struggle within KPSI’s 
direction pursued through political mechanisms too, with the demand for a legal umbrella 
in the form of special autonomy. Therefore, the idea of the enforcement of Islamic law, 
the author argues, seems to be less popular. 
Keywords: Historical, Philosophical-sociological, Enforcement of Sharia, Shouth 
Sulawesi. 
Abstrak 
Artikel ini membahas argumen historis dan filosofis-sosiologis perjuangan 
penegakan syariat Islam oleh Komite Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPSI). Secara historis, 
komponen pendukung KPPSI meyakini bahwa ide perjuangan syariat memiliki akar 
historis yang kuat di daerah ini. Begitu pula argumen filosofis dan sosiologis. Tetapi, 
meskipun benar bahwa argumen-argumen yang mendasari keinginan untuk 
memberlakukan syariat Islam itu sebagian besarnya dapat dibenarkan secara normatif, 
namun kenyataan bahwa secara politik tidak terdapat situasi yang dapat diinterpretasikan 
sebagai alasan pembenar yang mendasar untuk menuntut gagasan itu, menjadikan 
gagasan tersebut masih sebatas wacana. Apalagi, jika kemudian perjuangan ke arah itu 
ditempuh lewat mekanisme politik dengan tuntutan adanya payung hukum berupa 
otonomi khusus, maka tampaknya gagasan tersebut terasa kurang populer. 
Kata kunci: Historis, Filosofis-sosiologis, Penegakan syariat Islam, Sulawesi Selatan. 
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Introduction 
Ideologically-theologically, Muslims believe in the holistic nature of Islam. Some 
people even believe that Islam includes a total way of life, which later the body is stated 
in the Shari'a. Therefore, for some Muslims, Islamic law is believed to be a unified 
totality, which offers a solution to all the problems of life.1 
One of the implications of such a holistic view is the birth of a tendency to 
understand Islamic law literally. In fact, in reality, such a trend has been developed so far 
that it gave birth to a tendency to emphasize the legal and formal aspects of the idealism 
of Islamic teachings. For this reason, in the context of history, it is not too surprising if 
groups and trends emerge among the Muslim community who want to base their entire 
social, economic and political framework on Islamic teachings exclusively.2  
The desire to uphold Islamic law, both through political channels and legal 
constitutions and through physical struggles against the legitimate government, has 
become part of a long history of the struggle of Muslims in Indonesia.3 Whether it was 
by chance or not, in fact, the forms of thought and practice developed by thinkers and 
activists supporting the idea of upholding Islamic law are always thick with legalistic and 
formalistic nuances. 
The fall of the New Order regime on May 21, 1998, seemed to provide an 
opportunity again for the emergence of old ideas, such as those that were developed in 
the 1940s to the 1960s. For this reason, in the amendment process of the 1945 Constitution 
that began in the 1999 General Session of the MPR and the 2000 Annual Session of the 
 
1 As an expression of such beliefs, some Muslims hold that Islamic law includes three "d" namely: 
din (religion); dunya’ (the world); and dawlah (the state), see Nazih Ayyubi, Political Islam: Religion and 
Politics in the World Arab, p. 63-64, in Din Syamsuddin, “Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru,” Kata 
Pengantar (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. x; Muhammad Yusuf Musa, Nizhâm al-Hukm fî al-
Islâm (Kairo: Dâr al-Kitâb al-‘Arabî, 1963), p. 18. 
2 Expressions with such tendencies can be found in various symbolic terms that are currently 
popular, such as Islamic Revivalism, Islamic Awakening, Islamic Revolution or Islamic Fundamentalism. 
In Arkoun's view, such movements are consciously supported by groups who enjoy favourable social and 
economic positions so that they are willing to compromise and adopt conservative Islamic views because 
they do not have access to the modernity of thought. See Mohammed Arkoun, “The Concepts of Authority 
in Islamic Thought,” in Klauss Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), Islam: State and Society (London: 
Curzon Press, 1988), p. 70-71. 
3 Complementary descriptions of it can be read, for example: Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif: Islam dan 
Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985); B.J. Boland, 
The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); Bahtiar Effendy, Islam 
dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998); 
Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1987), and soon.  
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MPR, for example, there was another very strong attraction between groups wishing to 
reinstate the Jakarta Charter with other groups who had different views. In the community 
too, the demands to formally enforce Islamic law began to be voiced by several Muslim 
groups in various regions.4 In the community too, the demand to formally enforce Islamic 
law began to be voiced by several Muslim groups5 in various regions.6 
In South Sulawesi, the idea was rolled out by the Islamic Sharia Enforcement 
Preparation Committee (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam - KPPSI). As an area 
known as a fanatical Muslim, the emergence of such ideas in this area is not so surprising. 
Notably, in reality, KPPSI was not the first group to voice such ideas in this area. 
Previously, the DI/TII movement had emerged, which also carried the jargon of the 
struggle to uphold Islamic law.7  
The initiators8 Of the Islamic, Sharia Enforcement Preparation Committee 
(hereinafter written KPPSI) considered that since the New Order came to power, Muslims 
are a marginalized group. Therefore, the fall of the New Order in 1998 should not be let 
go by, because it is the right momentum for the rise of Muslims. KPPSI then took the 
initiative to appear at the forefront to fight for the demands of the application of Islamic 
law in this area.  
 
4 The discourse and desire to revive the Jakarta Charter had once arisen and was fought for by 
Muslim politicians before and during the 1999 MPR General Session and the 2000 Annual Session, such 
as Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang - PBB), United Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan - PPP), Daulat Ummat Party (PDU), Muslim Ummah Party (Partai Umat Islam - PUI), and 
Ummah Awakening Party (Partai Daulat Ummat - PKU), see also Mukrimin, “Islamic parties and the 
Politics of constitutionalism in Indonesia”, Journal of Indonesian Islam, volume 6, number 2, 2012, p. 
2900-2904; see also Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 5. 
5 Just to mention several examples, among groups who want the enforcement of Islamic law are 
the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia - MMI), the Ahlussunnah Waljamaah 
Communication Forum, the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam - FPI), the Indonesian 
Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam - KISDI), and 
others. 
6Other areas that are also known for the idea of enforcement of Islamic law are Banten, Pamekasan, 
Sumenep, Gresik, Malang, Garut, and Cianjur. 
7For the national coverage of DI, see Andi Rahman Alamsyah & Vedi R. Hadiz, Three Islamist 
Generations, one Islamic state: the Darul Islam movement and Indonesian social transformation, Critical 
Asian Studies, 49(1), 2017, p. 55. 
8 Of the idea for the formation of KPPSI included Aziz Qahar Muzakkar, Agus Dwikarna, Azwar 
Hasan, Zaitun Rasmin, and others. Their ideas were also supported by Muslim intellectuals including (the 
late) Prof. Dr H. Mattulada, Prof. Dr Ahmad Ali, Prof. Dr Abu Hamid, (the late) Prof. Dr H. Abdurrahman 
A. Basalamah, and others. 
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The organization, which was declared in October 2000, focused its struggle on 
demand for special autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, 
as was the case in the Province of Aceh, which had received approval from the central 
government. In the Muqaddimah, the recommendation of the struggle of KPPSI stated 
that philosophically, historically and sociologically, the enforcement of Islamic law in 
this area is a must as well as the historical task of Muslims.9 
For proponents who supported the KPPSI, historically Islam has always been the 
religion of the kings and their people in this area, becoming the basis of orientation and 
way of life. That is why South Sulawesi was then labelled "Serambi Madinah" (the 
Verandah of Medinah).10 Sociologically, the fact that the majority of the population of 
South Sulawesi is Muslim is a strong reason to support that idea. The fact that the legal 
system applied so far has proven ineffective in resolving the problems of the Ummah, for 
KPPSI supporters to be used as a philosophical reason to strengthen their ideas. 
This paper is focused on the historical and sociological arguments that occur in 
South Sulawesi. This paper is expected to be useful to broaden the horizon of Islamic 
politics. In this regard, Muslim understanding is not only concentrated on one idea which 
the fundamental reasons are still debatable is expected to be able to think of the constraints 
and limitations faced concerning the heterogeneity of life South Sulawesi Muslims are 
dealing with Republic of Indonesia state policies. This section also presupposes that 
Muslims are willing to renew their struggle strategy, so that the political experience of 
Islam in Indonesia in general, which has much history, is coloured by a counter-
antagonistic atmosphere - not only with the state but also with other Muslims -, no longer 
happening, without forgetting guidance moral and ethical values taught by Islam. 
 
9 See, Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan, Makassar, 19-21 Oktober 
2000/21-23 Rajab 1421 M, p. 6.  
10 According to Ahmad M. Sewang (Muslim historian of South Sulawesi), the term Serambi 
Madinah was first known after the G-30 S / PKI incident when the atmosphere of people's lives at that time 
was filled with fear of being labelled by the government as PKI minions. Among the efforts to free 
themselves from these suspicions, the Muslims in this area then made closeness to religious aspects as a 
choice because it was practically contrary to the teachings of the atheist PKI. Nevertheless, in later 
developments, some suggested that the choice be associated with the name Veranda of Medina as a 
counterpart to the title given to Aceh as the Veranda of Mecca. Interview with Ahmad M Sewang in 
Makassar, May 17, 2003. Nevertheless, for some people, the term is still not widespread and therefore still 
needs more in-depth study, primarily if it is then used as one of the steps in demanding the application of 
Islamic law in this area, as is the case in Aceh. Interview with Minhajuddin (Islamic religious leader), 
Makassar, May 18, 2003. 
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Historical Arguments for Sharia Enforcement in South Sulawesi 
The emergence of the idea of upholding Islamic law in South Sulawesi as 
championed by KPPSI in the reform order as it is today is not something new in Muslim 
communities in this area. A group of Muslims had previously fought such an idea in this 
area during the Old Order who called themselves the Darul Islam, the Indonesian Islamic 
Army (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia - DI/TII) group.11 Even though the nuances 
of thought and orientation of the struggle were different from those currently supported 
by KPPSI supporting actors, the emergence of the DI/TII movement beforehand was still 
interesting to mention. 
In the history of South Sulawesi, the emergence of the Darul Islam Movement or 
the Indonesian Islamic Army (Gerakan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia – DI/TII) 
in the 1950s was led by Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar.12 The movement that lasted from 
1950-1965, although in reality it was often regarded as only a form of disappointment for 
a group of soldiers whose aspirations were not given much attention to the central 
government at that time;13 However, in reality, the issue at that time was also oriented 
towards efforts to uphold Islamic law in South Sulawesi by forming a demarcation area 
in which Islamic law was applied as a basis for decision making, in accordance with their 
concepts and understanding of the Shari'a itself.  
 
11 Although history tells us that since the age of the kingdom in this area Islamic sharia has been 
enacted, then if this section is limited explicitly to tracing during the DI/TII period, then it is not intended 
to behead the historical event. However, it was solely intended to seek an adequate explanation of the 
accusations raised in the community that the emergence of KPPSI was a new form of the DI/TII struggle. 
The community's assumptions were mainly built from the fact that in various activities carried out by 
KPPSI, many were attended by old figures of former DI/TII and their families, especially with the election 
of Asiz Qahhar (youngest son of Qahhar Mudzakkar) as Chair of the KPPSI Tanfidziyah Lajnah.  
12 The name Qahhar Mudzakkar is often found in many versions. Sometimes it is written with 
Kahar Muzakkar, Kahar Mudzakkar, Qahar Muzakkar, Kahar Mudzakkir and others. However, based on 
his own admission, the truth is Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar. He explained in detail; Abdul means Servant, 
Qahhar means the mighty, Mudzakkar means male. So, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar means male servant of 
God, see Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Tjatatan Bathin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner, Jilid III (Singapura: 
Qalam Press, 1382 H), p. 113. Furthermore, the name Qahhar Mudzakkar must be done carefully, because 
some writers liken it to Kiyai Haji Abdul Kahar Mudzakkir. For example, it says: "Especially Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo and Kahar Muzakkir (who would later become terrorist leaders of the Darul Islam of South 
Sulawesi) ... For this reason, see Pipitseputra, Beberapa Aspek dari Sejarah Indonesia Aliran Nasionalis, 
Islam, Katolik sampai Akhir Zaman Perbedaan Paham (Ende-Flores: Nusa Indah, 1973), p. 304. 
Pipitseputra's statement was clearly invalid because Abdul Kahar Muzakkir was a signatory figure of the 
Djakarta Charter who never rebelled.  
13 Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak (Jakarta: 
Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1992), p. 94-97.  
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If our attention paid to the development process of the Qahar Mudzakkar 
movement, then there appear to be two stages of making Islam the ideology of the 
movement. The first phase, from 1950-1953, which Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar referred 
to as a time of mobilization and a transition period;14 dan tahap kedua dari tahun 1953-
1965 yang diistilahkan sendiri oleh Qahhar Mudzakkar dengan Revolusi Islam.15 
In Qahhar's view, the community had experienced the damage he termed as 
"swimmer check" (“centang perenang”).16 The global community groups at that time, 
such as liberalism, fake communism and religious world groups (outside of Islam) were 
regarded as factors that damage the world community.17 
He put it in this way: 
... “Liberalism world-class became drunk and forgot the land, fearing and dragging humans 
with the "nuclear" results of the technical ingenuity of the ratio. The Communist world 
group went crazy and forgot the land, fearing and dragging people into the "realm of animal 
association" with the "nuclear" threat of technical results with rational intelligence as well. 
The world group of Gadungan Nationalism is fueling the spirit of greed and greed 
nationality, the spirit of nationalism is narrow and narrow, throwing religion outside the 
fence of the State, inciting people to rebel and fighting endlessly. The world-class of 
Religion (outside of Islam), which denies the Oneness of God, such as Judaism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on. Becoming confused with the religious 
conviction, because they associate the Lord Jang Almighty, and cause them to live adrift in 
a world of doubt, "is doubt over the truth of Agamanja, doubt over the power of human-
personified spirits, doubt over the authority of human spirits, and doubt over all the Gods 
and statues they prayed to.”18 
After giving his analysis like that, Qahhar mentioned that only Islam could 
improve the situation of the world community. With his belief in the truth of Islam, he 
argues as follows: 
“The teachings of Islam carried by the Prophet Muhammad are much broader, more 
complete, more perfect, (covering human life in the world and hereafter), than the 
Adoration of the Prophet Musa (peace be upon him) in the Torah and the Adjunct of the 
Prophet Jesus (peace be upon him) in the Gospels. The Islamic teachings brought by the 
Prophet Muhammad covered all layers of the Human Ummah on the entire surface of the 
 
14 Qahhar Mudzakkar, “Tjatatan Bathin,” op. cit., jilid I, p. 11.  
15 Ibid.  
16 The term that he intended to describe the situation of the world community that was hit by the 
crisis of chaos at that time was used by Qahhar in various writings. See for example another book: Revolusi 
Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menudju Persaudaraan Manusia (Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 
1381 H), p. 21; “Tjatatan Bathin,” op. cit., jilid III, p. 11, and others. 
17 A description of the classification of the world community as intended above, see “Tjatatan 
Bathin,” ibid., p. 11-41.  
18Ibid., p. 10-11.  
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Earth, while the religion of Judaism and Christianity was only devoted by God to the 
Children of Israel.”19 
Based on his opinion, he made the teachings of Islam as the foundation of his 
movement and was not only intended for the Indonesian people, but also for world peace. 
In his letter to President Sukarno, it was stated that efforts to fight for world peace without 
moral force and without religious teachings, were in vain.20 Therefore, in the 
interpretation of Qahhar Mudzakkar, neither capitalist liberalism nor forced communism 
can possibly save the world community.21 
In its interpretation, the world problem faced today is not the advance of 
socialism-communism to replace capitalism-liberalism, but the growth of the spirit of 
human unity in the form of demands for self-determination. Departing from such a line 
of thought, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar advocated what he called Ichwatunism, a term 
derived from QS al-Hujurat verse 10 which reads: Innamal Mu'minuna Ichwatun ... which 
means: “Those who truly believe in God are "brothers."22 The teachings he advocated, 
according to Qahhar, were the spirit of Islamic nationalism that had been neglected by 
the religious scholars and leaders of the Islamic world. That caused the Muslim 
community throughout the world to become paralyzed. Because of the neglect of 
“Ichwatunism” by the religious scholars and leaders of the Islamic world: 
... “[T]hen the Islamic Ummah group is involved in rioting, making patchy matters of 
statehood, eliminating religion from the state and participating in seeking the structure of 
the state system, tracing the composition of the "fake nationality" system which is chaotic 
outside Islam, as happened in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq and so on”.23 
 Based on such beliefs, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar invited President 
Sukarno to become an advocate of world peace based on Islamic teachings. The invitation 
was conveyed in one of his letters: 
Bung Karno, whom I respected! 
“How happy and great our nation is under the leadership of Bung Karno if now and now 
Bung Karno as the great leader of Islam, the great leader of the Indonesian people, comes 
forward to appeal to the world community which is being feared by World War III, feared 
by the Nuclear power, returned to the road peace and peace which is indicated by God in 
 
19Ibid., p. 39.  
20 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, "Revolusi", op. cit., p. 26.  
21Ibid., p. 74.  
22Ibid., p. 76.  
23 Ibid.  
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all of its precepts which are in the Book of Sutji al-Qur'an and in the Books of Other 
Religion Sutji.”24 
After inviting President Sukarno to appear as a world figure who called for peace 
in accordance with Islamic teachings, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar showed the way. 
According to him, the straightforward way was "to replace Pantjasila with the Philosophy 
of God.”25 The complete sound of the decree proposed by Qahhar to Sukarno through his 
letter was to replace Pancasila with The Islamic Adjunct and the Other Religious 
Admissions, which were adopted by all Indonesian tribes."26 
Because of his strong acceptance and belief in the truth of Islam, during his 
leadership of the Darul Islam / Indonesian Islamic Army movement in the South Sulawesi 
region, Qahhar Mudzakkar enforced Shari'a laws in total accordance with his 
understanding and their natural form.  
During the implementation of Islamic law at that time, the level of crime and 
disobedience in society can indeed be minimized, as explicitly stated by Ja'far Sanusi. At 
length, the cleric figure who was once the Chair of the Ulema Council in one of the 
districts in South Sulawesi compared the level of disobedience and criminality that 
occurred in the community when Islamic Sharia was enacted or not.27 
Although it is possible that when the DI / TII movement came to power, the level 
of crime committed by community members can be minimized, but other phenomena are 
very paradoxical with Ja'far's argument. As stated by Anhar Gonggong, it was during the 
DI / TII period that various forms of crimes were committed, both to the soul and property 
committed by followers of the DI / TII movement.28 Crimes against the soul are mainly 
committed against those who openly display an attitude of disloyalty towards the 
movement, while crimes in the form of robbery, theft and the like are committed to secure 
food supplies for the continuation of the struggle.  
If these deviant behaviours are connected with the mission of the struggle they are 
touting, namely the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in which Islamic 
Sharia is implemented, then for reasons that are easily understood, such movements will 
not get sympathy and support. Indeed, the people of South Sulawesi at that time were 
patterned in groups that were pro and contra. Those who are pro are generally groups of 
people who feel they have benefited from the movement, both directly and indirectly. 
However, the majority of the population still considers the movement only as a splinter 
 
24Ibid., p. 25.  
25Ibid.  
26Ibid.  
27 Interview, Ja’far Sanusi (Ulama), Pinrang: 2 July 2017.  
28 Anhar Gonggong, op. cit., p. 57.  
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movement, which fights for and or in the name of Islam not because of ideological 
awareness alone, but more because of social and political factors.  
Therefore, too, when the TNI successfully paralyzed the movement in 1965, the 
people of South Sulawesi welcomed it joyfully, and even during the process of 
suppressing the movement, there was no lack of assistance given by the population to the 
TNI to accelerate its crackdown.29 
The phenomenon of community involvement, if interpreted, would mean that the 
issue of enforcement of Islamic law which was rolled out by DI / TII at that time did not 
get sympathy and community support, despite the fact that the majority of the people of 
South Sulawesi when it was a traditionally Muslim group, in the most general sense.  
It is possible because of the bitter experience that the South Sulawesi people had 
just experienced at that time so that when there was a change of regime from the Old 
Order to the New Order, the issues presented by Muslim groups seeking support were no 
longer in the hearts of the people. That feels right by paying attention to the vote 
acquisition of Islamic parties in the elections conducted during the New Order.  
The decline saw the political defeat of Islam in support of Muslims in this area to 
Islamic parties in every election. Even though in the 1950 elections, for example, the 
Masyumi Islamic party received majority support of 39.7%, followed by NU with 17.2%. 
However, in the 1971 election, which was attended by ten contestants, Golkar controlled 
all the battles in South Sulawesi.30 Practically there had been no longer visible traces of 
the triumph of Islamic parties that influence the power since the 1955 general election. 
Masyumi, which used to lead the vote, even suffered a lethal blow earlier after it was 
dissolved in 1960.31 The NU party, which succeeded at number three at the national level 
and number two in the province, became the only Islamic party that could still survive 
among the onslaught of the Golkar Party. Pada pemilu 1977, kala peserta pemilu hanya 
tiga, suara Golkar semakin kuat dengan rentang perolehan dari 55,7 % hingga 99,9 %. 
This was also the case with subsequent elections conducted during the New Order 
 
29 As was echoed by KH Latif Amin, a figure who became an eyewitness during the DI/TII 
movement said that since the DI/TII movement took place; the community did not feel sympathy because 
of the actions of their followers who often worried the population. Therefore, there is a government policy 
to crush the movement and immediately get a response from the public. One expression of the welcome 
was providing assistance in the form of valuable information about the existence of the group and by 
breaking the food supply chain, so that the movement's food supply was disrupted, although for this reason, 
the community had to bear the risk of robbery of the people's food products — author's interview with K.H. 
Latif Amin, Bone: 24 July 2015. 
30 See “Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan,” Kompas, 26 February 2004, p. 
32.  
31 Sukarno dissolved Masyumi in 1960 because several of its foremost leaders (such as 
Mohammad Natsir and Safruddin Prawiranegara) who were involved in the PRRI Rebellion. See Deliar 
Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1987), p. 349-357.  
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government. Golkar Might even endure. The fall of the Suharto regime with Golkar as its 
political engine did not dampen the confidence of the people of South Sulawesi in Golkar. 
The banyan party won 66.5% of defeating old rival parties and new parties. PPP became 
the second most popular choice after Golkar with 8.4% of the votes, followed by the PDI 
with 6.6%. PAN became the newcomer party with the most significant vote despite only 
recording 3.5%. Besides PAN, other parties that received little support were PKB (1.6%), 
PBB (1.4%) and IPKI party (1.3%).32 The 2004 legislative elections also showed results 
that were not much different, namely that Golkar was able to win majority support with 
a gain of up to 60.5%.  
 As an area with a robust Islamic basis, the data above shows that the so-called 
Muslims do not automatically become supporters of Islamic parties. On the other hand, 
this fact also shows that the ideological affinity of Muslims to Islamic parties is apparently 
not strong, on the contrary, the claims of Islamic parties as the sole channelling of people's 
aspirations - as they often appear in election campaigns - are challenging to accept and 
do not orrespond to reality in fact.  
The fact that since the 1980s the PPP party was marked by severe internal conflict 
has also caused the party not only to lose prestige but also reduce its credibility as an 
Islamic party. It is not surprising then that many Muslims themselves became less 
sympathetic to this party.33 
Apart from these problems, one thing is almost certain that the decline of Muslim 
support for the most part - not to mention everything - is motivated by the carrying out of 
engineering and ideological offensive34 New Order politics such as political restructuring, 
depoliticization, floating mass politics, and so on.  
Apart from the bureaucratic politics, which is carried out strictly by the 
government, by looking at political developments in the previous decade, it seems that 
among Muslims themselves there has been a significant shift in thought.35 Repeated 
 
32 See Voting for the 1999 Election in the Province of South Sulawesi, in “Kompas,” loc. cit.  
33 Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 
1991), p. 152.  
34 The term “ideological offensive" was put forward by Taufik Abdullah in his book Islam dan 
Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p. 40. 
35 For the recent bureaucratization of Islam, see Dominik M. Müller & Kerstin Steiner, The 
Bureaucratization of Islam in Southeast Asia: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs, 37 (1), 2018. 
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failures in the political arena, the development of religious fields which are factually 
beneficial to Muslims, religious politics that are more accommodating to the aspirations 
of Muslims and so on, are factors that contribute to a shift in thinking among Muslims. 
In other words, because the situation is so far apart, the Muslims have begun to redefine 
and reformulate their existence and political position in the face of new developments, 
which they feel are different from previous periods. 
This shift in thinking had an impact on the weakening of the remnants of the past 
Islamic political leadership, including their attitude towards Islamic figures. The 
influence of these Islamic figures, borrowing the term Fachri Ali, "although still 
respected, has completely been emptied of the political consciousness space of the people, 
especially among those who have been sacrificed."36 
Such a view is accurate, mainly if it is associated with the acceptance of the 
Muslim community in this area towards past Islamic figures. Regarding the figure of 
Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, for example, who once gave rise to the idea of an Islamic state 
through its DI / TII movement, for the present context there is only very limited sympathy 
for specific regions, especially the Luwu region which has become the socio-cultural basis 
of the figure. While in other areas, his figure is considered controversial; some even 
consider him an opportunistic figure.  
This opportunistic impression among the people of South Sulawesi was based on 
their understanding that the initial impetus for the DI / TII rebellion did not emerge from 
the theological-political awareness of the leaders and their supporters. There seems to 
have originated from the military policy of the central government that cannot be accepted 
by the ex-guerrillas fighters in this area. They demanded to be included in a specific block 
in the line of national armies formed at the time and wanted a separate military unit. 
Kawilarang, who was then serving as the Military Commander for Eastern Indonesia, 
refused the request. As he dismissed most of the ex-guerrillas' soldiers, he only wanted a 
small number of those chosen to be included in the TNI unit. Qahhar Mudzakkar (who 
was then in Java and was one of the charismatic guerrilla army leaders) was called home 
 
 
36 Fachry Ali, “Akomodasi Non-Politik Islam Indonesia dalam Struktur Orde Baru,” Prisma, No. 
3, Tahun XX, Maret 1991, p. 194.  
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and asked to mediate the conflict. After feeling that his efforts were not bearing fruit, he 
even joined in and led the resistance of the former guerrillas above.37 
A short time later, this military resistance turned into open political separation 
from the concept of a unitary state as defined by the central government at that time. Only 
at this level of resistance did Qahhar Mudzakar contact Kartosuwiryo and accept his 
appointment as "TII commander for the South Sulawesi region," and it becomes "the part 
of Kartosuwiryo's NII in West Java.”38 
The events that lasted for fifteen years (from 1950-1965), apparently left a less 
sympathetic impression among the people. The behaviour of the leaders and supporters 
of the DI/TII movement when it was not infrequently committing crimes against souls 
and property and honour, felt the community was contradictory to the jargon of their 
struggle, namely the desire to establish an Islamic state with the implementation of 
Islamic law in it. 
Because of the less sympathetic impression, when a similar idea reappears, 
namely the desire to uphold Islamic law as initiated by KPPSI, public opinion, especially 
in rural areas, is drawn back to the old idea. With a slightly suspicious tone, some even 
claim the idea as something to watch out for, even hostile.39  
Apart from the general description of the lack of adequate appreciation of such 
ideas and the accompanying issues, it is clear that there have indeed been changes of mind 
among Muslims in South Sulawesi to no longer immediately support ideas in the name 
of religion without concrete actions, which is felt to be of direct benefit to them. Golkar's 
victory in every election in this area that was previously a conventional supporter of 
Islamic parties can be used as a reason to strengthen the conclusion that there have been 
intensive and striking ideological shifts and changes among Muslims in this area. The 
choice of Golkar was clearly based on the fact that this party, which according to them at 
 
37 Complementary descriptions of the DI / TII Rebellion in South Sulawesi, see for example, B.J 
Boland, “The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia,” translated by Safroeddin Bahar: Pergumulan Islam 
di Indonesia (Jakarta: Graffiti Press, 1985); Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot 
Hingga Pemberontak (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1992).  
38 See B.J Boland, op. cit., p. 59.  
39 Such views, the authors extract from informal conversations with communities in Pinrang 
District. Although in a limited amount and may be considered unable to represent the population of South 
Sulawesi society in general, such views also cannot be ignored. Even the same impression, the author also 
found in some areas, although for that, it is no longer done in an organized manner.  
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the time had all the requirements, needed to improve their welfare. However, that does 
not mean that political Islam has disappeared altogether. Even though it has declined, it 
still has fanatical supporters among certain Muslims, especially groups that have 
primordial ties to the old Islamic political leadership. 
 The Philosophical and Sociological Arguments of Enforcement of Islamic Sharia in 
South Sulawesi  
Apart from historical reasons by considering the history of Islam in this area, the 
emergence of a desire to uphold Islamic law according to its initiator is also based on 
philosophical and sociological reasons. 
Philosophically and sociologically, the fact that the system applied so far has 
proven ineffective in solving various existing problems. The system should be a 
reference: that it is time to think about the implementation of a new system that is believed 
to be effective in resolving various existing problems. 
In Abdurrahman Basalamah's view, for example, one of the main causes of the 
crisis that has engulfed all aspects of people's lives today is mainly due to moral 
decadence. This was reflected in public service activities due to corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism. This is exacerbated by the law enforcement system, which is still very weak, 
apart from the fact that the legal substance here and there is still limited and part of it is 
still a colonial legacy, as well as law enforcement officials are still weak, especially in 
terms of morals. Very excited, he expressed his conviction that more than 90% of the 
people of South Sulawesi were dissatisfied with the positive law that had been in force so 
far. 
According to Abdurrahman Basalamah, the swiftness of un-Islamic values that 
are rolling in the community further strengthens the demand for the establishment of 
Islamic law. South Sulawesi, which is known as a religious area today, is no different 
from other regions. Influence is rampant; tyranny is everywhere, and so on. Only the 
establishment of Islamic law can overcome it all. Comment Basalamah who is also the 
Chairperson of the Indonesian Muslim University Foundation Waqf Foundation (Yayasan 
Badan Wakaf Universitas Muslim Indonesia). 
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In line with Basalamah, Ahmad Ali (Professor of Law at Hasanuddin University) 
philosophically describes the current state of the law in Indonesia. According to him, 
today, the level of citizens' trust in positive law is getting lower. That was caused by the 
public witnessing and knowing the existence of judicial mafia practices. Existing law and 
justice institutions can no longer be the last bastion for justice seekers. So sometimes, the 
community acts vigilantly in solving the cases it faces. Consequently, instead of crime 
can be suppressed, even more widespread.  
Therefore, as a first step to reduce the outbreak of violence due to the reduced 
level of public trust in the government and law enforcement, it is essential to restore the 
confidence of citizens in the law and law enforcement.40 What law? Of course, laws that 
are in accordance with the intrinsic value of the citizens of their communities. He added, 
the intrinsic value embraced by religious people certainly is the best choice for them. 
Moreover, for a Muslim, that choice is none other than the enforcement of Islamic law.41 
Similar view held by Angregurutta M Nur Muhammad, when he explained the 
issue of the function of the Shari'a in social life so that it must be formalized, by quoting 
the opinions of experts ushul fiqh explained that the function of the Shari'a is to protect 
and guarantee the safety and security and welfare of mankind, which includes five basic 
demands called maqhásid al-syariat which include: (1) hifz al-din, guaranteeing the 
freedom of people to have a religion, (2) hifz al-nasl, guaranteeing the sanctity of heredity, 
(3) hifz al-'aql, protecting the mind from influences that damage the functioning of reason 
in human life, ( 4) hidz al-nafs, protect and guarantee human safety, and (5) hifz al-mâl, 
guarantee and protect human material rights. 
For Nur Muhammad, this kind of sharia function can never be matched by secular 
law. Because in reality, secular law totally ignores the essential factors, which are the 
domain of religion.  
... “[t]hat's why humans have been given basic guidelines to make the necessary rules and 
laws if there is no text in the Koran and the Sunnah, with their ijtihad, as long as it still refers 
 
40 Ahmad Ali, "Penegakan Syariat Islam (Suatu Tinjauan Sosiologi Hukum)", Unpublished paper 
presented at the National Seminar on Enforcement of Islamic Sharia through Special Autonomy in Terms 
of Various Aspects (Makassar, 22 June 2001), p. 7.  
41 Ibid.  
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to the five principles. Because of this, Muslims in South Sulawesi can only live well and 
make meaningful contributions, if Islamic law can be enforced in this area.”42 
In the line of thought as stated by its initiators, KPPSI - as concretely stated by 
Sirajuddin (Secretary of the Shura Council of KPPSI) – who called for the implementation 
of Islamic law in kaffah by involving the government in its implementation. The 
following excerpts Siradjuddin's view about the implementation of Islamic law 
comprehensively (kaffah): 
Carrying out Islamic law in full and comprehensive (kaffah) is a collective 
obligation and responsibility of every believer; (2) Intentions in carrying out some Islamic 
Shari'a and rejecting some others will lead to the narrowness of life in the world and the 
punishment of Allah in the hereafter; (3) The Islamic Sharia enforcement is the peak of 
the struggle of the Muslims as God intended to deliver the glory of human life; (4) The 
enforcement of Islamic Shari'a in a kaffah is a concrete form of piety to Allah Almighty 
and becomes the solution of all crises and problems of human life.43 
Furthermore, rather emotionally, Siradjuddin rejected the assumption of some 
circles who said that the application of Islamic law was described as an orientation of the 
past and the desert community. According to him, these expressions are a mirror of 
Islamaphobia that has entered into the minds of Muslims.  
... “why are Muslims worried about Sharia law which is their religious law? Muslims are 
worried about clear and standard religious laws but are not worried about Western laws that 
are still patchy and have proven ineffective at solving problems. Today, Muslims tend to 
accept laws that are enforced nationally but reject laws that are enacted sharply”.44 
According to another KPPSI figure, Aswar Hasan, the fear of some circles about 
the implementation of Islamic law is groundless. It is partly because if one wants to be 
honest with the history of this nation, surely you will not evade the fact that the life of 
this nation is imbued with the Jakarta Charter. In fact, when the Presidential Decree of 
July 5, 1959, was rolled out by Sukarno, the Jakarta Charter was said to animate the 1945 
 
42 Interview with KH M Nur Muhammad, Makassar: 20 March 2017. 
43 Among a number of KPPSI figures, such as, Sirajuddin who were the most active in 
disseminating KPPSI ideas through his writings. Several writings he published in the internal circles of 
KPPSI much helped the writer in understanding the direction and objectives of the KPPSI struggle. His 
position as Secretary of the KPPSI Shura Council was organizationally strategic, making it possible to 
scrutinize the wheels of the organization. Therefore, perhaps it is not excessive if a number of his writings 
on KPPSI can be claimed to represent the true colours of KPPSI, especially so far, there have been no 
complaints from KPPSI figures about these writings.   
44 Interview with Siradjuddin, Makassar: 15 July 2017.  
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Constitution. In addition, in Indonesia alone, the Jakarta Charter had become the first 
constitution ratified by the founders of this Republic. The KPPSI Advisory Board 
Member believes:  
“If the Jakarta Charter is included in the Constitution, then Muslims will have a 
constitutional footing if they wish to convey their aspirations. During this time, every 
Muslim voice the Jakarta Charter, always declared contrary to the Constitution, Pancasila 
and government policies.”45  
Enthusiastically; but regrettably, Aswar Hasan said that existing Muslim leaders 
no longer had a strong commitment to making this happen, as had been shown by Islamic 
leaders in the BPUPKI and PPKI sessions.46 "In his analysis, if the Charter Jakarta has 
been successfully included in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, so KPPSI no 
longer needs to ask for a legal umbrella in the form of special autonomy for the 
implementation of Islamic law. 
Finally, one commentator put it succinctly in this way: Not surprisingly, the main 
point on the KPPSI’s agenda was the incorporation of Sharia-inspired regulations into the 
legal system of South Sulawesi. Politically, the kppsi took, and still takes, an anti-New 
Order and anti-corruption stance. Sharia will increase law and order, so the argument 
goes. Moreover, the KPPSI argued that the Sharia policy for Aceh has opened up the legal 
possibility for a further ‘shariatisation’ of regions with a traditionally strong Islamic 
character.47 
Conclusion 
Although it is true that both historically and philosophically-sociologically, the 
arguments underlying the desire to enforce Islamic law are largely normatively justified, 
but the fact that there is no political situation can be interpreted as a fundamental 
justification for demanding the idea, making the idea still limited to discourse. Especially 
if then the struggle in that direction is pursued through political mechanisms too, with the 
 
45 Interview with Aswar Hasan, Makassar: 30 April 2017.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Stijn Cornelis van Huis, “The Islamic Court of Bulukumba and Women’s Access to Divorce 
and Post-Divorce Rights”. In Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds.) Islam, Politics and Change: The 
Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto, (Leiden: Leiden University Press), 2016, p. 169-171. 
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demand for a legal umbrella in the form of special autonomy, then the idea seems to be 
less popular. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the emergence of KPPSI was more due to 
euphoric reasons among its supporters. It is, argaubly, a backlash against the long political 
experiences of Muslims whose history leaves more grim stories. 
At the same time, the idea was triggered by a crisis that gave birth to frustration 
and a sense of oppression that manifested itself in the form of a large number of abuses 
of power by the elite and caused widespread corruption, political crime, weak law 
enforcement, and economic powerlessness. At the community level, the crisis took the 
form of increasing crime, fading social solidarity and rampant immorality. This has a 
direct effect on the decline in the legitimacy of the existing secular-based political and 
legal system. Then came the desire to return to alternative values and systems based on 
Islam.  
Eventually, it becomes the most critical raison d’etre of the revival of religious 
movements such as KPPSI. If in reality, the movement emerged after the collapse of the 
New Order, then it was more because the era did provide sufficient space for the 
emergence of old and new ideas in an era marked by a climate of openness. 
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